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Incentive Systems under ex post Moral Hazard to Control Outbreaks of Classical Swine 
Fever in the Netherlands 
 
Previous experience in coping with outbreaks of epidemic animal diseases has shown that such diseases 
pose a true threat for regional and national economies as well as for an individual farmer and for related 
industries in the chain. In recent years, besides causing potentially high losses, combating outbreaks of 
highly contagious diseases raises social-ethical issues related to the mass slaughter of animals when 
controlling an outbreak. Yet animal welfare merits a more prominent position in the discussion regarding 
animal health. Added to this, there is growing concern about the potential impact of certain animal 
diseases (such as avian influenza) on human health and the possibility of a new pandemic. A proposal for 
a new European Community Animal Health Policy Strategy to improve the prevention and control of 
animal diseases was therefore announced in 2004, culminating in a Commission Communication in 2007 
setting out actions for 2007-2013 (European Commission 2004). Among other new initiatives, one of the 
important suggestions to this strategy is to recognize an essential role of behaviour on the part of livestock 
farmers and other participants in the chain (such as failure to comply with preventive and control 
measures or unwillingness to notify authorities) while combating animal diseases (Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2006). 
Numerous epidemiological and economic studies have been carried out to support decision 
making with respect to prevention and control of animal disease epidemics. Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen 
indicated that while useful in forecasting the spread of disease, analyzing direct impacts of diseases and 
the effectiveness of different preventive and control strategies, with few exceptions (Bicknell, Wilen, and 
Howitt 1999; Kuchler and Hamm 2000), the previous studies have not directly recognized the role of 
adequate incentives in promoting private decisions to reduce divergence between private and public 
consequences of a farm’s actions in combating animal diseases. 
Recent economic studies more often emphasize the public good aspects and externalities 
associated with prevention and control of contagious animal diseases (Grannis and Bruch 2006; Ott 2006).   3
The potentially large influence on the course of epidemic is pointed out to externalities referring to the 
farmers’ decisions on implementation and maintenance of preventive measures, early disclosure of a 
disease outbreak or a suspected problem, compliance with movement still control strategy and no 
deliberate infection during an epidemic (Meuwissen et al. 2006). Obvious incentives would exist for 
farmers to manage epidemics in a proper way because potential losses caused by an outbreak are high. In 
reality, farmers might pursue own interest and not always contribute to an adequate prevention and control 
policy. While making decisions both prior to an outbreak (ex ante) and following an outbreak (ex post) 
farmers will almost always know more about their risk exposure than the government. The presence of 
such information asymmetry leads to different contexts of moral hazard problem. Verifying that farmer 
behaviour is consistent with policy objective is very costly given the number of farms. Thus, structuring 
incentives so that a farmer’s actions are consistent both with their individual objectives and those of 
policy-makers should be paramount while dealing with the externalities to design animal health policy 
(Gramig et al. 2006). 
The current paper focuses on incentives systems under ex post case of moral hazard problem of 
early disclosure. This is when the farmer already posseses private information on the disease status or a 
suspected problem and makes the unobserved choices whether to report it (Graming et al. 2005). 
Depending on the design of the indemnity payments and the magnitude of regulatory costs of disclosure, 
the farmer may have an incentive to withhold the information on possibly infected animals if he expects to 
be worse off after disclosure. The situation when the profits from disclosing are less than profits from not 
disclosing forms the essence of principal-agent problem between the regulator and the farmer and 
highlights the conflicting incentives in their relationship. Specifically, farmers may either wait, hoping 
that their suspicion is false, or to ship the animals to market. In the case of true disease, either way the 
whole sector can be influenced negatively. If the animals are diseased and are shipped to market, the 
disease could be easily spread to other animals. Even if the diseased animals are not shipped to market, the 
disease can still be spread through feed suppliers and other inter-farm traffic (Ott 2006). Meanwhile,   4
timely government response in terms of implementing control strategies to limit the spread of epidemic 
and eradicate it is delayed. 
Early disclosure defines the time between disease introduction and detection of the first case, the 
so-called high-risk period (HRP) (Horst et al. 1999). During this period disease circulates freely that can 
result in infection of other herds. So, early disclosure also indirectly affects the number of infected herds 
present on a day of first detection (IHD). Both HRP and IHD are important determinants of the magnitude 
and financial consequences of an epidemic, and they cannot be influenced during an epidemic. Thus, the 
key government objective is to keep the IHD as small as possible by shortening the HRP by means of 
timely disclosure.
1 
Note that epidemic disease will not disappear by itself. Sooner or later it will be detected no 
matter whether farmers timely report it. However, the HRP shortening in the first place depends largely on 
the alertness, skills and motivation of farmers who since decades have already been reported to be the 
most important sources of detection outbreaks (Elbers et al. 1999).
2 
For these reasons, an incentive structure that results in timely disclosure is of great interest for 
policy makers. Incentive effectiveness however will depend on how well farmers’ behaviour is 
understood. 
Few recent studies presented theoretical principal-agent models that explore incentives 
compatibility for timely disease disclosure (Graming, Horan and Wolf 2005; Jin and McCarl 2006). These 
models suggested that incentive design based on the level of disease prevalence and the level of 
preventive investment would induce truthfully disclose of infected herds. These studies, however, 
assumed that the farmer knows the true disease prevalence in his herd. But in reality not all animal 
                                                 
1 The last classical swine fever (CSF) epidemic 1997-1998 in the Netherlands: it was estimated that CSF virus had probably been present for 5-7 
weeks in the country before the first herd was detected. Because of the lack of awareness of the presence of the virus during this period, neither 
was the movement of pigs restricted, nor were specific actions taken for rapid diagnosis of infected herds. This resulted in the large number of 
infected herds (about 39) before specific control measures came into force that severely changed the effectiveness of the eradication campaign 
(Stegeman et al. 2000). 
2 The last CSF epidemic 1997-1998 in the Netherlands: in 322 out of 429 outbreaks (75%), detection was bases on clinical signs observed: 32% 
was detected by the farmer, 25% by the veterinary practitioner, 10% of the outbreaks by tracing teams and 8% by screening teams of the 
veterinary authorities. In 76% of the outbreaks detected by clinical signs, the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for less than 1 week 
before diagnosis, in 22% for 1–4 weeks before diagnosis, and in 4 herds (1%) the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for more than 4 
weeks before diagnosis (Elbers et al. 1999).   5
diseases have obvious clinical signs. This means farmers often do not possess exact information on the 
true disease status. For instance, in cattle and pigs the signs of food-and-mouth disease (FMD) are usually 
readily seen, whereas sheep do not always show obvious FMD clinical signs. The clinical picture of 
classical swine fever (CSF) is not always characterized by a febrile disease with typical clinical signs and 
high morbidity and mortality (Elbers et al. 1999).
3 Also, the previous models ignored animal disease 
dynamics, which determines the economic consequences of an outbreak; in particular, in the case of 
highly contagious disease (see HRP and IHD above). Furthermore, for officially FMD or CSF-free 
countries that do not practice vaccination (World Organization for Animal Health 2006) an epidemic starts 
when virus is introduced into the animal production sector of the country. This implies that it does not 
make sense to aim a certain prevalence level of such diseases. The country must simply maintain the 
disease-free status as any single reported true case would be comparable to a prevalence level of 100%. 
In this paper, we argue that the nature of animal disease (e.g. highly contagious or infectious 
disease, the length of the incubation period, how obvious clinical signs are) matters greatly while 
designing incentive structure for early disclosure of contagious disease. A more complete analysis of 
farmer’s decision to timely report a disease outbreak or a suspicious case is needed. This study proposes a 
more realistic approach to tackle the problem of farmers’ motivation to disclose of a disease. A simple 
conceptual stochastic dynamic programming model is used to better understand and optimize the 
individual farmer decision of a timely disease reporting, given certain incentive parameters defined by a 
regulator. An empirical study is performed in the context of CSF, a highly contagious disease without 
obvious clinical signs, in the Netherlands. The model allows us to investigate which disease parameters 
and economic incentive parameters are essential and how they influence farmers’ decision on early 
disclosure. After providing basic results, the article discusses their implications and the further model 
improvement and including of principal-agent relationship in the model. 
 
                                                 
3 The last CSF epidemic 1997-1998 in the Netherlands: when there were clinical signs, the observed symptoms in infected herds were mainly 
atypical: fever, apathy, ataxia or a combination of these signs (Elbers et al. 1999).   6
Incentives for Early Disclosure of CSF in the Netherlands 
CSF is a highly contagious viral disease of pigs. Under natural conditions the most frequent route by 
which the CSF virus enters its host is oronasal (i.e., relating to the mouth and nose) with an incubation 
period of 7-10 days, which is the time between infection and the start of disease symptoms (Dahle and 
Liess 1992). CSF is classified by the World Organization for Animal Health as List A disease, which 
implies compulsory notification.
4 The Netherlands is free of CSF and introduction of the disease into the 
country can cause a huge epidemic resulting in dramatic economic losses (Meuwissen et al. 1999; Mangen 
and Burrell 2003). 
There is a legal obligation to report suspicious cases to the authorities. The Dutch Law for Animal 
Health and Welfare defines that if an animal shows symptoms of contagious disease this must be reported 
to the government authority, Center for Animal Disease Reporting of the Dutch Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority. However, the actual reporting rate is rather low (3-4 suspicious cases per year), 
whereas CSF clinical symptoms (e.g., fever or loss of appetite) are more often observed in pigs with other 
considered animal disease such as flue (Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 2003). 
Current Dutch surveillance programs that aim at early detection of CSF also mainly rely on the 
visual recognition of CSF clinical signs. At present, Dutch Animal Health Service has the following 5 
surveillance programs in place: (1) routine gross pathology of severely diseased pigs (pathology), (2) 
routine virological tests of tonsils of all pigs submitted under routine gross pathology (tonsil); (3) daily 
clinical observation by the farmer (farmer); (4) periodic (4-weekly) clinical inspection by a veterinarian 
(inspection); and (5) leucocyte counts in blood samples from diseased animals on a herd where 
antimicrobial “group therapy” is started (leucocyte) (Klinkenberg et al. 2005). Actual participation in 
surveillance programs (tonsil and leucocyte) is estimated to be alarmingly low, i.e. less that 0.1% of the 
cases obliged for regular reporting (Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 2003). 
                                                 
4 List A: includes transmissible diseases which have the potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, which are of 
serious socio-economic or public health consequence and which are of major importance in the international trade of animals and animal products. 
Note that CSF does not pose a risk for public health.   7
It should be noted that in an attempt to create incentives for early disclosure, the Netherlands has instituted 
compensation programs that in case of epidemic no longer pay producers for dead animals and only partial 
compensation is given for diseased animals (Horst et al. 1999). The motivation is that once the animal is 
dead, too much time has past to compensate farmers. 
According to Kuchler and Hamm, an indemnity program that is working will show the number of 
reports, approaching zero. But the fall has to be the result of increasing difficulty in finding suspicious 
cases rather than in a lack of incentive to look (Kuchler and Hamm 2000). In this sense, the above 
information indicates that the incentives for early disclosure do not appear to be compatible as they 
currently stand in the Netherlands. Extra testing and quarantine costs (farm has to be closed while 
awaiting test results) borne by the farmer while reporting a suspected case, irrespective of whether this is a 
true or false case are considered to be the main hindrance to early disclosure (Dutch Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority 2003; Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2006). 
One way to encourage farmers to act positively on their suspicion of CSF is to offer compensation 
for extra losses associated with the detection of actual disease status. Also, when the farmer knows that in 
case of and outbreak, he will be compensated for test-positive animals, then he will more likely contact a 
veterinarian or animal health official when he suspects disease. On the other hand, an efficient incentive 
system should consider payments that prevent farmers from over-reporting (or in the worst case, infecting 
animals themselves during an epidemic in order to get a payment). 
Farmers should, however, also have their own incentive to timely report suspicious animals. 
Despite some extra testing and quarantine costs related to outbreak detection, an individual farmer faces a 
smaller consequential loss when the outbreak is earlier discovered on his farm. This is a kind of indirect 
incentive. No disclosure or even hiding sick animals will cause a wider disease spread and, thus, increases 
the consequential losses for each individual farmer affected by an outbreak. After depopulation the 
detected farm remains empty until restocking is permitted. The longer the epidemics the longer it takes 
before farmers can repopulate and operate their farm again. 
   8
Model for the Farmer’s Problem 
Under different scenarios with a range of various incentive system parameters, the discrete dynamic 
programming model developed in this study identifies optimal time for the farmer to report CSF. 
This study considers a single average Dutch, farmer (profit-maximizer) with a herd of 2000 
fattening pigs showing certain degrees of CSF clinical signs. Our basic assumption is that the farmer 
implements all the necessary biosecurity measures to prevent CSF outbreak. Basically, this assumption 
implies that there is no ex ante moral hazard problem considered in this paper. 
The farmer aims at maximizing his expected profits and he should decide whether or not 
disclosure CSF. As explained above, clinical signs of CSF are not easily observable. Following 
Klinkenberg et al., the three disease degrees of showing clinical signs were defined: 
-  non-specific disease: if any clinical symptoms (such as fever, dullness, diarrhea, or loss of appetite) 
are observed; 
-  specific disease: if some CSF-specific symptoms (conjunctivitis, skin haemorrhages, cyanotic ears, or 
lameness) were observed; 
-  severe disease: if the animal died, or if the highest recorded body temperature was ≥ 41
oC, combined 
with at lest four reported (CSF specific or non-specific) symptoms. 
The farmer is assumed to be the final decision-maker in his choice to report the disease status to 
the government in a timely manner. In real life, veterinarians or other advisors can also be involved in 
control of animal health status and, therefore, influence the farmer’s decision. In the case of disclosure, a 
farmer will face extra costs (regulatory testing costs and other losses such as costs associated with 
isolating the farm while awaiting the tests outcomes). These costs are supposed to minimize the risk of 
extreme cost of CSF epidemics. 
The farmer is assumed to be risk averse. Preferences are represented by a constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility function (Hardaker et al. 2004). Each time period t (stage), a farmer observes 
health (expressed by showing degrees of CSF clinical signs: no clinical signs, non-specific disease, 
specific disease, severe disease) of his pigs S (state), takes an action xt (decision on CSF disclosure or not),   9
and gets returns that depends on both the state of the system and the action taken f(xt St,). The farmer seeks 
a sequence of report - not report decisions that prescribe the action that should be taken in any given state 
and time period so as to maximize the farmer’s net profits over a time horizon T. 
It is assumed that a CSF epidemic is started in disease-free zone. In particular, CSF virus is 
introduced into the farm, thought a farmer does not know this for sure (T = 1, after incubation period is 
finished). Time t measured in days of the HRP, 2 days are considered as 1 time period in this study. The 
farmer faces no decisions after the terminal decision period T, which is defined as the end of HRP and 
equal to 10 in this study (T = 10, which is 20 days). 
The next period’s state is not known with certainty. The next state of the system depends on the 
current state, the current stage, the action (decision on CSF disclosure or not). As for the clinical signs 
disease development data, field data (i.e. from the previous outbreak) could not be used because infection 
times of individual animals were not known. Therefore, the data were derived from successful 
experimental infections with the CSF virus strain of the Dutch CSF epidemic (unpublished data) in which 
the clinical signs were observed closely (Klinkenberg et al. 2005). Based on the experimental data, the 
following transition probability matrix was obtained (for instance, the transition probability of the herd 
going from state 0 to state 1 at a certain time period is 88%): 








0 0.12  0.88  0  0 
1  0  0.44 0.42 0.14 
2 0  0  0.20  0.80 
3  0  0 0 1.00 
 
This study assumes that the farmer does not know the true value of any visual suspect of the 
observed degree of clinical disease. Probabilities of CSF exposure perceived by the farmer while 
observing a certain degree of showing CSF clinical signs are used in this study. These probabilities were 
estimated by experts as 0.2, 0.5 and 0.7 while observing “non-specific disease’, “specific disease” and 
“severe disease”, respectively.   10
The current expected return per farm in the time period t, f (xt, St), under certain incentive system 
parameters is defined by the following expression: 
f (xt, St) = – α3 (TestingCost(xt) – QurantineCost(xt)) – DirectCost(xt) – IndirectCost(xt)+ 
 + α1CompensationD1(xt)+ α2CompensationD2(xt) 
where D1 and D2 is the number of diseased and dead animals, α1 is the share of the full compensation paid 
by the government for diseased animals, α2 is the share of the full compensation paid by the government 
for dead animals, α3 is the share of the CSF testing and farm quarantine costs paid by the farmer. 
The risk-averse farmer’s dynamic programming problem can be formally stated as 
{}
T
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where E is the expectations operator, δ is a daily discount factor and λ is the farmer’s constant level of 
absolute risk aversion. In this paper, λ is assumed to be 0.01, which reflects a moderate risk-averse farmer 
(Hardaker et al., 2004). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Basic results of the developed simple (conceptual) stochastic dynamic programming model show the 
effect of using different incentive system designs on the farmer’s decision to report CSF earlier, given that 
the farmer observes a certain degree of clinical signs in the herd. Under different incentive system designs, 
the model defines the earliest period when it is optimal for the farmer to disclosure the disease. To gain 
more insight into major model characteristics, a sensitivity analysis was carried out. 
 
Optimal Farm Plans of Early Disclosure 
Figure 1 shows results of the farmer’s optimal policy of reporting CSF scenario for planning 
horizon of 10 periods (T = 10), under the baseline scenario. The baseline scenario was defined as the 
situation when no extra incentives were applied, compared to the current Dutch compensation policy. That 
is no compensation for dead animals and only 50% compensation for diseased animals is given, and no   11
compensation for regulatory costs (testing costs and farm quarantine costs) associated with disease 
disclosure is provided. 
The optimal reporting policy for the basic farm resulted in a decision of the earliest CSF 
disclosure in the period 7 (i.e., day 14) while observing the ‘specific disease’ degree of CSF clinical signs 
(table 1). The certainty equivalent gain for the farmer to report in this period is €6.39 per pig. Note that the 
current simple model does not provide yet steady-state probabilities that the herd will be in each state, i.e., 
showing certain degrees of CSF clinical signs. In this sense, higher certainty equivalent gains after the 
period 7 should not be interpreted as optimal policy of waiting and reporting in the latest possible periods. 
Given the transition probability matrix, the herd most likely will move to the next state, i.e., ‘severe 
disease’ degree of showing CSF clinical signs, and reporting in this state will be more expensive for the 
farmer. 
Table 1 illustrates how changes in incentive system parameter influence the farmer’s decision on 
early CSF disclosure. Specifically, changes in parameters α2 and α3, which are share of the full 
compensation paid by the government for dead animals and share of the CSF testing and farm quarantine 
costs paid by the farmer, respectively, were analysed. The model was run under scenarios with a range of 
various parameter settings. The obtained results show that applying penalties for dead animals and 
providing extra compensation of testing and farm quarantine costs indicate that certain designs of 
incentive systems may improve the farmer’s deciding behaviour to report CSF earlier while observing 
certain degrees of the disease clinical signs. However, this would involve rather substantial changes in 
incentive system design, providing only partly compensation for regulatory costs (testing and farm 
quarantine costs) associated with the detection whether a suspicious case is the true case would not be 
enough. For example, to motivate the farmer to report CSF 1 and 2 periods earlier than in the baseline 
scenario (7
th period), introducing of €10 and €40 penalty per dead pig (which are equivalent to -0.1 and -
0.4 share of full compensation for dead animals) or providing 20- and 35-time extra compensation of 
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Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine how robust the results of the baseline scenario with 
respect to the farmer perception of probability of not false alarm decision to report CSF while observing 
certain degrees of showing CSF clinical signs in the herd. The baseline scenario, presented above, uses 
expert values of these probabilities, specifically 0.2, 0.5 and 0.7 while observing the degrees of clinical 
signs ‘non-specific disease’, specific disease’ and ‘severe disease’, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the effect of changing probabilities of CSF risk exposure perceived by the farmer 
while observing the ‘specific disease’ and ‘severe disease’ degrees of CSF clinical signs, i.e., 6 and 4 
scenarios of increased and decreased in steps of 0.1 probabilities, respectively. The examined scenarios 
indicate that the higher the perceived probability of CSF risk exposure the earlier reporting period is and 
visa versa, compared to the baseline scenario. For example, the probabilities of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 while  
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Table 1. Optimal Farm Plan of Early Disclosure while Observing Specific CSF Clinical Signs Under Different Incentive System 
Parameters (λ=0.01) 
  Baseline 
Scenario  Scenarios by Changing α2 Scenarios  by  Changing  α3  Scenarios by 
Changing α2 and α3 
Incentive  system  parameters:                 
α1 – share of the full compensation 
paid by the government for diseased 
animals 
0.5  0.5  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
α2 – share of the full compensation 
paid by the government for dead 
animals
1 
0.0  0.5  -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
α3 – share of the CSF testing and farm 
quarantine costs paid by the farmer
2  1  1  1 1 1 1 1  -20 -35 -40  -35 
Optimal time period to report  7  9  6 5 4 3 2  6  5  4  4 
1 In this study, market value of a fattening pig is €100. 
2 In this study, testing and farm quarantine costs are € 3000. 
 
 
Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis of the Baseline Scenario with Respect to Farmer Perception of CSF Risk Exposure while Observing Certain 
Degrees of Showing CSF Clinical Signs in the Herd 
 Baseline 
Scenario 
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios 
Probability of CSF risk exposure while observing S1 0.2  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Probability of CSF risk exposure while observing S2 0.5  0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Probability of CSF risk exposure while observing S3 0.7  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Optimal time period to report  7  9 8 6 6 5 4 8 8 5 1 
S1 = non-specific disease 
S2 = specific disease 
S3 = severe disease 
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observing the degrees of clinical signs ‘non-specific disease’, specific disease’ and ‘severe disease’, 
respectively, result a decision of CSF disclosure in the period 5 result, which is 2 periods earlier that 
optimal period in the baseline scenario. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that results of this study are sensitive to changes in probabilities of 
CSF risk exposure perceived by the farmer while observing a certain degree of showing CSF clinical signs 
(table 2). This indicates that this parameter is rather critical for the model and accurate elicitation of such 
parameters is essential. At the same time, these results imply that the surer farmer is about the actual 
occurrence of CSF in case of observing ‘specific disease’ or ‘severe disease’, the earlier he would report 
CSF himself, without any extra incentive. In this sense, developing of simple diagnosis tools (e.g. cheap 
farm-level tests) to support the farmer’s judgment about actual CSF danger would help to assure the early 
CSF disclosure. 
Also, Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen point to the fact that incentives under any government 
control program will, in addition to program parameters, depend on the quality of any disease detection 
tests. In order to better understand the benefits of public veterinary disease management programs, a study 
of how test quality can affect farm incentives to protect against disease and farm investment decisions 
should be of interest. 
 
Final Remarks 
The current (conceptual) stochastic dynamic programming model shows clearly possibilities of using 
incentives to influence farmers’ decision on early CSF disclosure. To influence the farmer’s optimal 
decision-making to report earlier, rather significant changes in incentive systems are needed. The model 
also shows the importance of the farmer’s perception of CSF risk exposure while observing different 
degrees of CSF clinical signs. 
Currently, the model is further developed into directions, i.e., to better model the farmer efforts, 
and to include the principal-agent approach. Both directions are explained briefly below. 
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Effort of the Farmer 
The current model assumes that the farmer observes the health status of his animals each time period t, 
which implies a certain constant amount of the farmer’s monitoring effort. In reality, the amount of 
farmer’s monitoring effort affects the farmer’s ability to timely report disease. So, it would be logical to 
include a certain probability distribution regarding the quality of the decision on timely disease disclosure. 
The underlying assumption is that a greater effort on part of the farmer increases the probability of timely 
disease disclosure at the same time period t when the system (herd) is in the certain state (certain degree of 
clinical signs is observable). Basically, chance that the decision will occur at the time period t as the 
system is in a certain state depends on the farmer’s effort to check the health status of the animals. This 
effort can be expressed as amount of time spent by the farmer each time period to observe the health status 
of his animals; each amount of time corresponds to a certain detection probability. 
 
Principal-Agent Approach 
The presented model helps better understand farmer behaviour while deciding whether to report a disease 
and how different incentive system parameters influence this behaviour. However, in its current form the 
model is limited to reveal whether the certain parameter configurations satisfy the regulator. Adding 
principal-agent relationship to the model would allow identifying Nash equilibrium incentive system 
parameters and associated indemnity agreements between the farmer and the regulator. Basically, a 
regulator whose objective is to shorten the HRP in case of the CSF outbreak should be included in the 
model. The regulator (principal) wants individual farmers (agents) to act on his behalf to ensure timely 
reporting of cases suspicious for CSF, in practice and not on paper only. To do this, the regulator would 
consider different than current indemnity agreements with farmers, namely agreements that offer adequate 
incentives for truthful disclosure of disease status. 
   16
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